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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
JUAN JOSE LOPEZ, JR., : Case No. 890324-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal follows the convictions of Second Degree 
Murder and Child Abuse in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 
and 76-5-109 (1953 as amended), respectively. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-26(2)(a) 
and 78-2-2(3)(i) and (4)(a) (1953 as amended), which allow a 
defendant in a criminal case to appeal a conviction of a first 
degree felony to the Utah Supreme Court, which may subsequently 
transfer the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1989, 
the Utah Supreme Court poured over this appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals establishing the requisite jurisdiction for this Court to 
hear the issues challenging the propriety of the convictions 
obtained at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court erroneously deny Mr. Lopez1 motion 
to sever the two counts charged against him and, if so, does that 
error require reversal of the convictions adjudged against him? 
2. Did the trial court erroneously fail to give critical 
language in its instructions to the jury on manslaughter, and did the 
prosecutor misstate the law on that same issue of manslaughter such 
that either or both errors require reversal of the convictions 
against Mr. Lopez? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Juan Jose Lopez, Jr. was charged with Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203) and 
Child Abuse (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109), a first and second degree 
felony, respectively. Mr. Lopez was found guilty of both charges 
following a jury trial which lasted three days, November 23, 25 and 
28, 1988. Judgments of conviction were entered on both charges by 
the Honorable John A. Rokich of the Third Judicial District Court on 
January 9, 1989, and Mr. Lopez was sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for respective terms of five years to life and one year to fifteen 
years, to be served consecutively. Mr. Lopez now appeals both 
convictions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant, Mr. Juan Jose Lopez, Jr., and the victim in 
this case, Ms. Cindy Redfox Hernandez, had been acquainted with one 
another since the fall of 1986 (T. 259). Approximately two months 
before Christmas of 1987 (T. 262), Mr. Lopez moved into an apartment 
at 213 West 400 North in Salt Lake City with Ms. Hernandez and her 
three children: Roberto, age 7; Amanda, age 3; and Lillian, age 1 
(T. 168). 
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Mr. Lopez ("Juan") and Ms. Hernandez ("Cindy11) shared a 
bed and together managed household and familial duties, including 
the payment of rent and other bills (T. 264-65). Juan maintained an 
enjoyable relationship with Cindy and the children (T. 262, 318). 
He played the role of husband to Cindy and father to the children 
cooking and caring for them, taking them places, and loving them 
(T. 91-92, 262-63). Unfortunately, both Juan and Cindy abused 
alcohol and used illicit drugs (T. 155, 156-57, 163, 268, 276-78, 
302). 
On March 1, 1988, the Lopez-Hernandez family awoke around 
7:00 a.m. (T. 265-66). Breakfast was prepared by Juan, and the 
children were readied for the day (T. 266). Roberto left for 
elementary school across the street from his home and Juan took the 
two girls, Amanda and Lillian, to the day care (T. 266-67). Cindy 
left for school (T. 267). Juan returned home and did some cleaning 
and then visited his father and a few friends (T. 268-69). Juan 
also drank some beer and used some cocaine while at home that day 
(T. 268). Later in the day, he began preparations for the familyfs 
evening meal (T. 269-71). 
Around 2:30 p.m., Juan picked up Amanda and Lillian from 
day care and returned home; he played with them until Cindy and then 
Roberto returned from school an hour or so later (T. 271). After 
eating dinner (shortly after 4:00 p.m.), Cindy left the home 
indicating she was going to the shoe store (T. 86, 271-72). Juan 
stayed home with the three children (T. 272). 
Later that evening, after dark, Cindy telephoned home and 
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spoke with Roberto. She told him that she was still at the store, 
but Roberto could hear lots of laughing and loud music (T. 88). 
Roberto did not believe her; he thought she was at a bar (T. 89). 
Roberto told Juan that she was not coming home because she was at 
the bar, the Annex (T. 272). Juan remained with the children for a 
while watching television and playing with them (T. 273). After two 
or three hours, the three-year-old began asking for "her mommy" 
wanting her to return (T. 273-74). Although worried, Juan then left 
the children home alone and went looking for Cindy (T. 273-74). 
Juan found Cindy at the Annex bar; she was drinking with 
friends (T. 274). Juan explained to her that the children were 
missing her and wanted her home. Cindy became angry and told him 
she was not coming home; she also told him to get away from her and 
that she was with her friends (T. 275). This answer upset Juan 
because the children wanted their mother; he felt that he had been 
with them all day and evening and that it was time for their mother 
to pay attention to the children and their needs (T. 275). 
Juan moved away from Cindy to the other end of the bar 
and started drinking as well. He encountered a couple of his 
friends and drank some beer and Mexican liquor and also used some 
cocaine and marijuana (T. 275-76). 
During the course of the evening, Juan saw Cindy and a 
Black woman enter the bathrooms. He believed that Cindy was selling 
drugs, and he confronted her telling her not to sell drugs at the 
Annex bar (T. 277). Near 12:45 a.m. on March 2, 1989, Juan left the 
bar taking a taxicab back to the apartment (T. 236, 277). Cindy was 
- 4 -
still at the bar when he left for home (T. 276-77). 
Juan sat at home and watched television while drinking 
more beer (T. 278). Roberto was in the front room with him—from 
either sleepwalking (T. 68-69) or from letting Juan in by unlocking 
the door (T. 278). Later, two men and a woman arrived at the 
apartment (T. 69, 241, 278). Testimony suggested that the visitors 
entered the bathroom together, ostensibly to do drugs (T. 70), but 
that testimony was disputed (T. 244, 249-50). 
Cindy finally arrived home. Although Roberto did not see 
anyone with her (T. 102), other testimony established that she 
arrived with a white male whom she introduced to Juan as her new 
boyfriend (T. 245-46, 280-82). Juan refused to let him in the house 
and shut the door in his face (T. 246, 282). Cindy became angry 
over that action and also became angry over the others being in the 
house. She ordered that the visitors all leave (T. 70, 10-203, 246, 
280-81). She further ordered that Juan get out (T. 281, 283-84). 
At least two of the visitors left, perhaps all three 
(T. 246-47, 251-52). Some testimony suggested that one visitor, 
Chito (Augustin Valesquez), remained behind, however (T. 103-04, 
108-110). 
Juan and Cindy then began to argue. Cindy called Juan a 
"motherfucker" and she also called his mother and father 
"motherfuckers" (T. 283-84). She again ordered him out of the house 
that instant (T. 284). He told her that he would not leave then but 
that he would leave in the morning (T. 284). She persisted and 
again ordered him out that very moment. She threw a piece of 
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pottery at him, which he dodged; it broke on impact against the wall 
(T. 285-86). 
Juan testified that he then blacked out, next remembering 
blood on his hands and on a knife he was holding (T\ 287). Other 
testimony helps to fill in what happened. Roberto, the 
seven-year-old, was present in the room (T. 70). He testified that 
Juan and his mother were arguing and that he threw his mother 
against a wall by the pottery (T. 71-72). Roberto then saw 
Mr. Lopez go into the kitchen and return with a large knife 
(T. 72-73). Holding the knife at his side, Mr. Lopez pushed 
Roberto's mother (T. 73). The knife must have been dropped (or 
placed down) because Roberto saw Mr. Lopez pick it up, raise it over 
his head, and then "make it go down fast" towards his mom 
(T. 73-74). Roberto saw Mr. Lopez stab his mother one time and he 
heard his mother scream very loudly (T. 74). Roberto then went into 
his room and shut the door behind him (T. 74). He said, "it got 
quiet" after that (T. 74). 
The medical examiner's testimony explained that more than 
a single stabbing occurred. The medical examiner, Dr. Sweeny, 
testified that Ms. Hernandez received at least six significant stab 
wounds, three of which were life-threatening (T. 135-46). While he 
could not indicate the order of the wounds, Dr. Sweeny indicated 
that the cause of death of Cindy Redfox Hernandez was multiple stab 
wounds (T. 147). She had been murdered. 
Roberto later heard a noise in his mother's bedroom 
(T. 75). He opened his door and saw Juan "digging in [his] mom's 
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purse" (T. 109). Roberto went to check on his mother but was told 
by Juan that she was okay and just sleeping (T. 110). Juan told 
Roberto to go back to his room (T. 110). 
Roberto, however, noticed blood all over Juan's hands and 
he asked Juan why it was there (T. 110-11). Juan told him it was 
because he had beaten up the guy who didn't want to go home 
(T. 76). Roberto then testified that Juan grabbed him by the neck 
and choked him (T. 111). A cord from the vacuum cleaner was then 
wrapped around his neck and pulled tight, but not that tight 
(T. 112). Roberto heard Chito tell Juan to "wash the knife off and 
put it where it was" (T. 109-110). Roberto then passed out not 
waking up until the morning (T. 78). 
Dr. Sweeny examined Roberto seventy-two hours after the 
incident (T. 158). Dr. Sweeny's practice involves examining dead 
bodies and he has no experience whatsoever with examining injuries 
such as Roberto's on living persons (T. 160). Nonetheless, the 
doctor testified that of the ten to fifteen times he had observed 
petechial hemorrhaging on corpses, Roberto's case was more 
impressive (T. 153-54). He indicated that, in his opinion, the 
injury to Roberto was survivable due to the resiliency of youth 
(T. 161). 
Juan had given police two other stories as to what 
occurred both in the home the early morning of March 2, 1988, and 
following the stabbing and choking incidents (T. 182-86, 189). At 
trial, Juan stated that after seeing the bloody knife in his hand, 
he moved Cindy's body to the center of the room, closed her eyes, 
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and covered her up with a blanket; he then went to his father's home 
located close by (T. 289). 
Juan's father tied him up and they returned to the 
apartment (T. 290-91). Upon viewing the scene, Juan's father 
encouraged Juan to pack and they left for Reno, Nevada (T. 291-92). 
After spending the night in Reno, Juan's father boarded a flight to 
Mexico (T. 293), and Juan traveled to Wendover and later to Burley, 
Idaho, where he was arrested and returned to Utah (T. 219, 293-94, 
297-98). 
Juan's statements to police officers varied from blaming 
Chito for the stabbing to claiming that Cindy stabbed herself, 
always denying that he stabbed her (T. 228). At trial, he could 
only remember that he had bloody hands and was holding a bloody 
knife while Cindy laid dead (T. 286-87). He testified he did not 
intend to kill Cindy and that he could not remember harming Roberto 
(T. 302). 
Juan was charged with Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree and Child Abuse (R. 14-15). A pretrial motion was made 
urging that the two charges be severed and separate trials held 
(R. 55-56, T. 5-9). The trial court took the motion under 
advisement (T. 9-10) and later denied the motion (R. 57). 
Counsel for Juan Lopez objected to the trial court's 
failure to give critical language in the manslaughter instruction 
requested by the defense (T. 379-80). 
The prosecutor in closing argument misstated the law 
regarding manslaughter, and an objection was lodged and sustained by 
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the court (T. 344-45). A motion for a mistrial based on that 
misstatement of the law was made and denied by the court (T. 380). 
The case was submitted to the jury, which returned guilty 
verdicts on both counts against Mr. Lopez (R. 143-44). 
This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court denied Mr. Lopez' motion to sever the 
Homicide count from the Child Abuse count. That ruling was in error 
under Rule 9 (a) and (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
because the two crimes did not arise out of the same criminal 
episode as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1953 as amended) 
and because trying the two counts together worked prejudice to 
Mr. Lopez' rights to a fundamentally fair trial. The error requires 
that both convictions be reversed and new and separate trials 
ordered. 
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on critical 
language involving the law of manslaughter. The prosecutor 
misstated the law on that same important question in his closing 
arguments to the jury. Both actions were in error and prejudiced 
Mr. Lopez' rights to a fair trial. Reversal of his convictions are 
accordingly required and new trials ordered. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT MR. LOPEZ1 MOTION TO 
SEVER THE TWO COUNTS CHARGED AGAINST HIM. 
Mr. Lopez was charged in a two-count indictment of having 
committed Criminal Homicide, Second Degree Murder and Child Abuse 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203, a first degree felony, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-109, a second degree felony, respectively). Prior to 
trial, Mr. Lopez filed a motion to sever the two counts and to hold 
separate trials on each count (R. 55-56). Following argument on the 
motion, the trial court took the matter under advisement (T. 4-10). 
Afterwards, the trial court denied the motion (R. 57), and the case 
proceeded to trial on both counts (T. 27). Mr. Lopez asserts that 
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the motion 
to sever, that he was denied due process and suffered prejudice 
because of the error, and that the error requires reversal of his 
convictions and new and separate trials on each count. 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, codified 
at Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9 (1980) (see Addendum A for full text of 
the Rule), outlines considerations applicable to the issue of 
obtaining a severance. Specifically, Mr. Lopez urges that two 
subsections of the Rule control the question in this case and 
indicate that his motion to sever should have been granted. Those 
subsections read in pertinent part: 
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(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the 
same indictment or information in a separate count 
for each offense if the offenses charged arise out 
of a criminal episode as defined in Section 
76-1-401, U.C.A. 1953. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
or defendants in an indictment or information, or 
by a joinder for trial together, the court shall 
order an election of separate trials of separate 
counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide such other relief as justice requires. 
Rule 9 (a) and (d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1980) 
(emphasis added). Mr. Lopez maintains that the two counts charged 
against him in this case—Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203) and Child Abuse (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-109)—did not arise out of the same criminal episode as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 and as required by Rule 9(a). 
Mr. Lopez further maintains that a trial on both counts prejudiced 
him with the jurors requiring a severance under subsection (d) of 
Rule 9. 
The decision to grant or deny a motion to sever is 
discretionary with the trial court, and convictions will be reversed 
for failure to grant a motion to sever only on a finding that the 
trial court abused that discretion. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738, 740 (Utah 1985). Notably, case law has further instructed that 
due process is implicated in such decisions and that care must be 
taken to balance the interests of the defendant with considerations 
of economy and judicial administration, with doubts being resolved 
in favor of severance. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Utah 
1986); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980). The trial 
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court's denial of a motion to sever is reversible when the 
defendant's right to a fair trial is impaired. State v. Velarde, 
734 P.2d at 445. 
A. COUNTS I AND II OF THE INFORMATION DID NOT 
ARISE OUT OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE AS REQUIRED 
BY RULE 9(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. 
Rule 9(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
references Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1953 as amended) for the 
definition of "single criminal episode." That section reads: 
"Single criminal episode" defined—Joinder of 
offenses and defendants.—In this part unless the 
context requires a different definition, "single 
criminal episode" means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an 
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to 
limit or modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in 
controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants 
in criminal proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1953 as amended).1 This statute requires 
that criminal conduct must be (1) closely related in time and (2) 
must have a single criminal objective. Utah case law indicates that 
a deficiency in either prong defeats a finding of a single criminal 
episode. 
Mr. Lopez maintains that the two crimes at issue were not 
necessarily closely related in time as interpreted by case law. In 
1 Section 77-21-31, cited in the second paragraph of 
Section 76-1-401, was repealed in 1980. The compiler's notes 
indicate that Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is the 
relevant replacement. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (Supp. 1989). 
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State v, Ireland, 570 p.2d 1206 (Utah 1977), and State v. Cornish, 
571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court found that 
"criminal acts separated by a day or by the time it takes to drive 
65 miles were not closely related in time for the purpose of 
§ 76-1-401." State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1983). 
Inarguably, the facts of the case at bar cover a shorter time frame 
than those in State v. Ireland and State v. Cornish. However, those 
cases, at a minimum, successfully demonstrate that the 
contemporaneousness of the crimes is not dispositive of the issue. 
Mr. Lopez notes that even conceding the closeness in time 
prong to be met on these facts still results in a finding in his 
favor because the second prong, the accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective is wholly lacking. Under this second 
consideration of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401, Mr. Lopez' motion to 
sever should have been granted. 
Utah case law clarifies that the facts of this case do 
not demonstrate a single criminal objective for both crimes. In 
State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court 
examined convictions of "unlawful taking of a vehicle"2 and "failure 
to stop at the command of a police officer"3 in a factual 
circumstance not unlike the case at bar analytically. The Court's 
short opinion in State v, Cornish is attached as Addendum B. 
The defendant in State v. Cornish had taken an automobile 
which was later reported stolen. An officer spotted the stolen 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1953 as amended). 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5(1) (1953 as amended). 
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vehicle and a high-speed chase ensued ultimately resulting in 
capture of the defendant. Mr. Cornish was first convicted of the 
"unlawful taking" charge and subsequently tried on the "failure to 
stop" charge. He claimed the second trial was in violation of 
double jeopardy prohibitions because both charges arose out of a 
single criminal episode. The trial court disagreed, and Mr. Cornish 
was tried and convicted of the second charge on the very same facts 
produced at the first trial which were stipulated to by the parties 
as the sum total of the evidence. 
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the second 
conviction finding the two crimes did not meet the definition of 
"single criminal episode." The Court specifically found that the 
crimes were separate in criminal objective. In addressing the 
concept of singular criminal objective, the Court noted: 
The objective of the unlawful taking was to 
obtain possession, be it permanent or temporary, 
of another's automobile. It was a completed 
offense at the time the car was taken. The 
objective of the failure to stop was to avoid 
arrest for the traffic violations he had just 
committed and/or to avoid being found in a stolen 
motor vehicle. To treat them as a single criminal 
episode would mean that any crime a defendant 
commits to avoid arrest for prior criminal 
activity would be part of the same criminal 
episode. This does not appear to be the intent of 
the statute and although the testimony given may 
overlap, the offenses are different and the proof 
requirements are different. 
State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d at 577 (see Addendum B for complete text 
of case). Notably, the prosecutor in the case at bar, and 
presumably the trial court as well, relied on the same faulty 
reasoning rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cornish. 
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The prosecutor urged that both the murder and the child abuse 
occurred in a single criminal episode because the child abuse was an 
attempt to cover up the murder (T. 8). The above quote from 
State v, Cornish reveals the error of that position. 
Moreover, as noted by the Supreme Court in State v. 
Cornish, as well as defense counsel at the motion to sever (T. 9), 
the fact that the testimony regarding both charges overlaps does not 
require that the two counts be resolved at a single trial. Rather, 
the two offenses charged against Mr. Lopez were different and so 
were the requirements of proof. The motion to sever should have 
been granted and separate trials held. The failure to sever the 
counts violated due process strictures and prejudiced Mr. Lopez1 
rights to a fair trial. Fourteenth amendment, United States 
Constitution; Article I, § 7, Utah Constitution. That topic is the 
focus of subpoint B of this argument and is fully discussed therein 
under subsection (d) of Rule 9. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED MR. LOPEZ1 
MOTION TO SEVER CONTRARY TO RULE 9(d) OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 9(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was 
urged as a basis to sever the counts of Second Degree Murder and 
Child Abuse (T. 6-7). That subsection states in pertinent part: 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
or defendants in an indictment or information, or 
by a joinder for trial altogether, the court shall 
order an election of separate trials of separate 
counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide such other relief as justice requires. 
- 15 -
Rule 9(d) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1980). The trial court 
indicated at the hearing on the motion to sever that prejudice could 
be a concern when trying a count involving an attempt to harm "a 
youngster" together with a homicide count (T. 7-8). The trial judge 
took the motion under advisement noting that he would consider 
"whether the prejudicial effect [of trying the two counts together] 
would outweigh the probative [value]" (T. 9). Ultimately/ the court 
denied the motion to sever without further illumination as to basis 
(R. 57). 
Mr. Lopez insists that the court's ruling was in error. 
He maintains that the court applied an incorrect standard and that 
the ruling denied him due process and prejudiced him with the 
jurors. Irrespective of subpoint A, this violation of the Rule 
warranted granting the motion to sever. 
Specifically, Mr. Lopez claims that the charge of Child 
Abuse on a seven-year-old child, notably a severe choking attempt, 
would taint the trial of the Murder count and prejudice the jurors 
against him for at least two reasons. 
First, children are unquestionably society's greatest and 
best loved resource. Children are innocent and vulnerable and 
require nurturing and protection. Our laws extend the furthest when 
protecting the interests of our children. Our Supreme Court has 
noted: 
Crimes against children are usually looked upon as 
more heinous than those committed against adults, 
and intentional crimes are more blameworthy than 
crimes committed by negligence. 
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State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986) (citing Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983)). It is highly likely that any jury 
who heard testimony on the Child Abuse charge would be swayed 
against Mr. Lopez as a person such that his chances of receiving a 
fair trial on the Murder charge would be substantially diminished. 
Second, to convict Mr. Lopez of Second Degree Murder, the 
prosecution necessarily had to prove an intentional or knowing 
killing, or an intent to cause serious bodily injury which is 
clearly dangerous to human life and which causes death. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (a) and (b) (1953 as amended). It is well 
recognized that intent is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and 
positive evidence and ordinarily must be inferred from acts, 
conduct, statements, and circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 
711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985). The jurors in this case were so 
instructed (R. 113). Accordingly, on the facts of this case, the 
jurors may have looked at the independent act of choking the child, 
Roberto, to assist in forming the requisite finding of intent on the 
Murder charge. Such reliance would be error, however, and 
demonstrates a critical reason why the charges should have been 
severed. 
In State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court decided that events subsequent to the death 
of the victim were not to be considered in establishing the mens rea 
for the prior killing. The Court explained: 
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The jury may well have been swayed by the 
reprehensible conduct of the defendant subsequent 
to her death. But that conduct is not before us 
for review. The evidence is undisputed that [the 
victim] was dead when defendant arose from the 
bed. He himself covered her face with a sheet, a 
universal gesture acknowledging death. At that 
moment the conduct which subjected him to a charge 
of criminal homicide came to an end. 
Id. The facts of the case at bar are analytically indistinguishable 
from those pointed out in State v. Bolsinger. At issue in the 
Homicide charge against Mr. Lopez was whether he committed a Second 
Degree Murder or a Manslaughter (R. 143, 145; T. 344, 348-49, 357). 
In denying the motion to sever the Child Abuse count from the 
Homicide count, the trial judge abused his discretion and violated 
Mr. Lopez1 due process rights to a fundamentally fair trial. His 
erroneous ruling placed before the jury testimony of the 
death-threatening child abuse on Roberto which jurors most likely 
used to find a greater culpability for the Homicide count than 
otherwise existed from the evidence. As in Bolsinger, the murder 
victim was dead and actually covered by a blanket. The child abuse 
occurred after her death and, although reprehensible, was beyond the 
conduct which subjected Mr. Lopez to a Homicide charge. 
As the Supreme Court has noted on several occasions, the 
prejudicial impact of the jury hearing other charges simply cannot 
be underestimated. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 
1986); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980). The 
prejudicial impact on the first charge can only be heightened when 
the accompanying charge is as arousing as the charge of Child Abuse, 
the intense choking of a seven-year-old child to the level testified 
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to in this case. Accordingly, reversal of the convictions is 
warranted. 
Mr. Lopez further notes that the trial judge misapplied 
Rule 9(d) in ruling on the motion to sever. The trial court 
indicated a concern that prejudice resulted from trying the two 
counts together (T. 7, 8). He then indicated he would balance that 
prejudice against the probative value (T. 9). That standard is in 
error. Rule 9(d) does not contemplate or allow a balancing of 
prejudicial effect versus probativeness. Even assuming the court 
misspoke, its ruling was wrong for two reasons. 
First, Rule 9(d) contains mandatory language requiring 
that if prejudice exists from trying the two counts together, the 
court shall order separate trials. Second, the only balancing which 
enters consideration is whether the prejudice to the defendant is 
outweighed by considerations of economy and practicalities of 
judicial administration. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444-45 
(Utah 1986). However, the Court has instructed that any doubts on 
the issue of whether a severance is required is to be resolved in 
favor of granting the motion to sever. _Id. at 445. Because this is 
a homicide case, any such balancing must further weigh in favor of 
severing the two counts. 
Had the trial court granted the motion to sever the 
counts and hold separate trials, the outcome of the verdict on the 
homicide charge may very well have been different. The Supreme 
Court has instructed that where errors occur in application of the 
procedural rules which results in the erosion of confidence in the 
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verdict, reversal of the convictions is required and new trials 
ordered. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988) (citing 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987); Rule 30(a), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (1980)). Inarguably, without the 
testimony of Roberto Hernandez regarding the child abuse, and 
without the testimony of Dr. Sweeny regarding the extent of that 
abuse, a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result existed 
for Mr. Lopez. Absent that inflammatory charge and related 
testimony, Mr. Lopez likely would have been convicted of 
Manslaughter. Accordingly, the confidence in the convictions 
obtained against Mr. Lopez which followed the erroneous denial of 
the motion to sever is eroded and those convictions therefore must 
be vacated and new and separate trials ordered. 
II. MR. LOPEZ WAS PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DENIAL OF HIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON 
MANSLAUGHTER AND BY THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT 
OF THE LAW OF MANSLAUGHTER IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Mr. Lopez requested the trial court to instruct the jury 
on manslaughter asking that the following language be incorporated 
in the instruction: 
In referring to the reasonableness of the excuse 
or explanation, it is not required that the 
killing be reasonably explained or excused. 
Rather all you must find is that there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse for the extreme 
emotional disturbance. 
(T. 379-80). The trial court instructed the jurors on manslaughter 
but refused to include the above-requested language (R. 129). 
Mr. Lopez excepted to the trial court's failure to give the 
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clarifying language (T. 379-80). 
The following discussions occurred during the 
prosecutor's closing argument: 
[MR. VUYK:] There were three life-threatening 
wounds with a long-bladed knife. No question. 
The only question is did he, in fact, do that 
while he was so intoxicated that he doesn't 
remember anything, so he couldn't form any intent, 
or whether he was so impassioned by some of the 
other problems that he says arose between he and 
Cindy that there was a justification or excuse for 
the killing? 
Now, the judge instructed you that this 
excuse has to be viewed from the viewpoint of a 
reasonable man, not the viewpoint of Juan Lopez as 
he stood there that day, but what would a 
reasonable man do in the same circumstances. 
That's what you have to determine. 
Ask yourselves one question: With regard to 
the argument, how many people in this world every 
single day are told by a lover or a spouse that 
they don't want them around any more, they have 
found somebody new. And in response to that, how 
many of them kill the other individual? That's 
what you have to remember, what a reasonable man 
that night—would a reasonable man that night have 
stabbed Cindy Hernandez to death? No, he 
wouldn't. A reasonable man would have viewed it 
was, done whatever was necessary, maybe tried to 
get back together. But a reasonable man would not 
kill Cindy Hernandez because she had another 
boyfriend. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I apologize for the 
interruption, but I think I have to interject. I 
think Mr. Vuyk is [mis]stating the law. 
The statute and instructions clearly say that 
the reasonable excuse or explanation is for the 
emotional disturbance, not for the act itself. 
And I think he is mischaracterizing what the law 
is. 
THE COURT: I have to agree. 
MR. VUYK: Thank you. 
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(T. 344-45). Later, defense counsel made a motion for mistrial 
because of the prosecutor's misstatement of law (T. 380). The trial 
court denied the motion (T. 380). 
Mr. Lopez indicates that the trial court's refusal to 
give the requested clarifying language in the instruction and the 
prosecutor's misstatement of the law on the same point confused the 
jury and denied him due process as did the failure to grant the 
motion for mistrial. He was prejudiced by the errors and requests 
that his convictions be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
The manslaughter statute reads in pertinent part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if 
the actor: 
(b) causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(b) (1953 as amended). The plain 
language of this statute indicates that the reasonable explanation 
or excuse relates to the emotional disturbance and not the killing. 
In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 467-72 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed the history of the manslaughter statute in 
an effort to clarify the requisite origin of the emotional 
disturbance. In doing so, the Court resolved the question at issue 
in this case noting: 
[D]efendant's subjective mental state should be 
irrelevant in determining whether the explanation 
or excuse for the disturbance is reasonable. 
Id. at 471 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the prosecutor was wholly 
incorrect in his argument to the jury. Additionally, the trial 
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court was also wrong to have denied the requested language which, in 
fact, was substantiated by the law and which offered critical and 
correct focus to the jury. Both errors require reversal. 
Mr. Lopez is entitled to have the jury instructed on his 
theory of the case. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980). 
Implicit in that body of law is that the jury be instructed clearly 
and fully. Ij3. The trial court's failure to give the requested 
clarifying language, coupled with the prosecutor's comments muddying 
the topic, mandates reversal of the convictions because confidence 
in the jury verdict is now at question. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 
100, 105-06 (Utah 1988) . 
Equally, the prosecutor's argument to the jury demands 
reversal of the conviction. In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the standard for reversing 
convictions when prosecutors exceed the permissible bounds of 
argument. The Court noted: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a 
criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and [2] were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
Id. at 486 (quoting State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). 
Both prongs of this test are met by the prosecutor's argument. 
First, it has been established that the prosecutor did 
misstate the law. He erroneously urged the jurors to focus on 
whether the killing of Ms. Hernandez was supported by a reasonable 
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explanation or excuse rather than the extreme emotional disturbance, 
the latter being the law. Accordingly, he called to the attention 
of the jurors matters which they were not justified in considering 
in determining their verdict. Prong one is met. 
Second, because of the complexity of the manslaughter law 
and the lack of the clarifying language included in an instruction 
as requested by Mr. Lopez, the jurors were probably influenced by 
the misstatement of law by the prosecutor. The Supreme Court in 
Troy noted that in close cases, "jurors may be searching for 
guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be 
especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence 
may be sufficient to affect the verdict." State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 
at 486. 
Whether the homicide of Ms. Hernandez was a Second Degree 
Homicide or a Manslaughter was a close call in this case. That 
determination hinged on the critical assessment of whether a 
reasonable excuse or explanation existed for Mr. Lopez1 extreme 
emotional disturbance. 
The facts of this case were such that the jury could have 
found that a reasonable excuse or explanation did exist for 
Mr. Lopez1 extreme emotional disturbance. Mr. Lopez was physically 
and emotionally involved with Ms. Hernandez and her three children. 
He functioned as a member of that family enjoying the roles of both 
husband and father. Mr. Lopez committed to those relationships and 
gained a great deal of personal satisfaction from his "belonging" to 
the family. Those relationships meant a great deal to him and to 
- 24 -
the family. 
The events of March 1 and 2 tore at the very core of 
Mr. Lopez. He loved the children and Ms. Hernandez; yet, he became 
frustrated over Ms. Hernandez1 lack of involvement with him and the 
children. She ignored them and deceitfully slipped out to a bar. 
She rejected Mr. Lopez and displayed no interest in the children, 
opting instead to stay with her friends to drink and ingest drugs. 
Even though Mr. Lopez also spent some time at the bar drinking and 
using illicit drugs, he still beat her home. Yet, when 
Ms. Hernandez returned to their home, she suddenly informed him that 
he was no longer part of the family or the home. She even refused 
him time to move out and called him and his family "motherfuckers." 
Mr. Lopez was hurt and angry, and he and Ms. Hernandez 
argued, pushed, yelled, and screamed. Two additional factors 
exacerbated his emotional disturbance. One, both Mr. Lopez and 
Ms. Hernandez were under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Two, 
Mr. Lopez had been told as a child that his mother had died giving 
birth to him; at thirteen years of age, he learned that she had 
actually deserted him and his father at birth and was still alive 
(T. 256-57). 
When Mr. Lopez learned that Ms. Hernandez was also 
leaving him, and replacing him with a new boyfriend, his reaction 
involved much more than the moment. That he became disturbed is an 
understatement. When Ms. Hernandez angrily ordered him out of his 
home and away from his family, which had become such an integral and 
enjoyable part of his life, Mr. Lopez experienced an extreme 
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emotional response. Ms. Hernandez was also responding emotionally, 
and with the drugs and alcohol working in both systems, the 
altercation escalated and turned violent. The disturbance resulted 
in the stabbing death of Ms. Hernandez. 
These tragic facts could have allowed the jurors to find 
that Mr. Lopez was under the influence of an extreme emotional 
disturbance at the time he stabbed Ms. Hernandez so that his 
culpability—not responsibility—for the death was reduced. 
Unfortunatelyf the prosecutor's misstatement of the law 
and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury with the 
requested critical language likely prohibited the jurors from fully 
considering the facts. These errors probably influenced the jury's 
verdict meeting prong two of the Troy test and requiring that 
Mr. Lopez' convictions be reversed. At a minimum, the errors 
instill a loss of confidence in the reliability of the verdict such 
that the convictions should be vacated and new trials ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the above reasons, the Appellant, Juan 
Jose Lopez, Jr., requests that this Court review these claims of 
error and order that his convictions be reversed and new and 
separate trials be ordered. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States reads in 
pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah reads: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 reads: 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined— 
Joinder of offenses and defendants.—In this part 
unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all 
conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a 
single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to 
limit or modify the effect of section 77-21-31 in 
controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants 
in criminal proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 reads in pertinent part: 
76-5-203. Murder in the second degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony 
of the first degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 reads: 
76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional 
disturbance does not include a condition resulting 
from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305, 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse under Subsection (l)(b), or the reasonable 
belief of the actor under Subsection (l)(c), shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person under the then existing circumstances. 
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: 
Rule 9. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in 
the same indictment or information in a separate 
count for each offense if the offenses charged 
arise out of a criminal episode as defined in 
Section 76-1-401, U.C.A. 1953. A felony offense 
and a misdemeanor offense may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if: 
(1) they arise out of a criminal 
episode; and 
(2) the defendant is afforded a 
preliminary hearing with respect to the 
misdemeanor along with the felony offense. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in 
the same indictment or information if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
Such defendants may be charged in one or more 
counts together or separately and all of the 
defendants need not be charged in each count. 
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When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with any offense, they shall be tried 
jointly unless the court in its discretion, on 
motion or otherwise, orders separate trials 
consistent with the interest of justice. 
(c) The court may order two or more 
indictments or informations or both to be tried 
together if the offenses, and the defendants, if 
there is more than one, could have been joined in 
a single indictment or information. The procedure 
shall be the same as if the prosecution were under 
such single indictment or information. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
or defendants in an indictment or information, or 
by a joinder for trial together, the court shall 
order an election of separate trials of separate 
counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide such other relief as justice requires. 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses 
or defendants is waived if the motion is not made 
at least five days before trial. In ruling on a 
motion by defendant for severance, the court may 
order the prosecutor to disclose any statements 
made by the defendant which he intends to 
introduce in evidence at the trial. 
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads in pertinent 
part: 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
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ADDENDUM B 
STATE v. CORNISH Utah 577 
Cite as 571 P.2d 577 
PER CURIAM: 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Defendant was convicted of failure to 
Respondent,
 s t 0p a t t^ e c o m m a n c | 0f a police officer, a 
v. class A misdemeanor. 
Edward Lane CORNISH, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14782. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 1, 1977. 
Defendant was convicted in Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M. 
Hanson, Jr., J., of failure to stop at the 
command of a police officer, and he appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant's failure to stop did not arise out of 
the same "single criminal episode" as that 
which justified his prior conviction for un-
lawful taking, and that double jeopardy 
therefore did not prevent his conviction on 
charges of failing to stop. 
Affirmed. 
Criminal Law e=»202(1) 
Where defendant was arrested after 
high-speed chase and after he stopped vehi-
cle in which he was riding and ran into field 
where he was taken into custody, defend-
ant's conviction for failure to stop at com-
mand of police officer, occurring after he 
was convicted of unlawful taking of vehicle 
in which he was riding, was not barred by 
principles of double jeopardy, since actions 
serving as basis for second conviction did 
not take place as part of same "single crimi-
nal episode" as those serving as basis for 
unlawful taking conviction. U.C.A.1953, 
41-1-109, 76-1-401, 76-1-403. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Larry R. Keller and Ronald J. Yengich of 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., William W. 
Barrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
Briefly stated: On June 19, 1976, one 
Dotson parked his car at a lounge. When 
he returned some seven hours later it was 
gone and Dotson reported it to the police. 
On June 21, 1976, at about 1:30 a. m., 
Officer Harris gave chase to the stolen ve-
hicle traveling in the wrong lane of traffic. 
After a high-speed chase, defendant 
stopped the car and ran into a field where 
he was taken into custody. 
The only issue involved the interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann., Sec. 76-1-403 (Supp. 
1975), and what is meant by a "single crimi-
nal episode." Defendant was originally 
charged with failure to stop at the com-
mand of a police officer and with theft. 
Pursuant to a motion by the State, separate 
complaints were later filed. Defendant 
was convicted of the crime of "unlawful 
taking of a vehicle" under Sec. 41-1-109, 
U.C.A.1953. 
Subsequent to the conviction for unlaw-
ful taking, the instant suit was commenced 
for failure to stop. Because the evidence 
was the same at both trials, it was stipulat-
ed that the transcript of the earlier trial 
could be introduced as the sum total of ail 
the evidence. Defendant claims the two 
offenses were sufficiently related to consti-
tute a "single criminal episode," and that 
the trial for failure to stop was prohibited 
by statute and was in violation of state and 
federal protections against double jeopardy. 
We disagree and affirm the conviction. 
The phrase "single criminal episode" was 
defined by the legislature in Utah Code 
Ann., Sec. 76-1-401 (Supp.1975) as follows: 
In this part unless the context requires 
different definition, 'single criminal epi-
sode' means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an at-
tempt or an accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective. [Emphasis added.] 
Not only were the two offenses charged 
separated in time by approximately one full 
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day, but they also were separate in objec-
tive. The objective of the unlawful taking 
was to obtain possession, be it permanent or 
temporary, of another's automobile. It was 
a completed offense at the time the car was 
taken. The objective of the failure to stop 
was to avoid arrest for the traffic violations 
he had just committed and/or to avoid be-
ing found in a stolen motor vehicle. To 
treat them as a single criminal episode 
would mean that any crime a defendant 
commits to avoid arrest for prior criminal 
activity would be part of the same criminal 
episode. This does not appear to be the 
intent of the statute and although the testi-
mony given may overlap, the offenses are 
different and the proof requirements are 
different. Because the offenses are dis-
tinct, the question of double jeopardy does 
not even arise, as that protection relates to 
prosecutions more than once for a single 
offense.1 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ronald L. SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14859. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 17, 1977. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart 
M. Hanson, Jr., J., of issuing a bad check 
and theft by deception and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that: 
(1) defendant's warning the payee that 
there were insufficient funds to cover the 
check did not raise the defense of voluntary 
termination and entitle defendant to an in-
struction thereon where defendant, at the 
time he warned payee, had already issued 
the check, had taken possession of a deed in 
exchange for the check, had transferred the 
property to a third party, and the account 
on which the check was drawn had been 
closed the previous day; (2) the prosecutor's 
approaching the bench and holding a discus-
sion in front of the jury after receiving a 
negative answer from defendant as to 
whether he had ever been convicted of a 
felony was not prejudicial, and (3) an in-
struction, "where a person intentionally 
does that which the law declares to be a 
crime, he is acting with criminal intent, 
sven though he may not know that his act 
or conduct is unlawful," was not erroneous. 
Affirmed. 
1. False Pretenses <s=52 
In prosecution for issuing bad check 
and theft by deception, defendant's warn-
ing payee that there were insufficient 
funds to cover check did not raise defense 
of voluntary termination and entitle de-
fendant to instruction thereon where, when 
defendant warned payee, he had already 
issued check, had taken possession of deed 
in exchange therefor, had transferred prop-
erty to third party, and account on which 
check was drawn had been closed the day 
prior to the offense. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>706(1), 1037.1(3), 
1037.2 
After prosecutor received negative an-
swer from defendant to question whether 
he had ever been convicted of felony, prose-
ctor 's approaching bench and having dis-
cussion in front of jury, but out of their 
hearing, did not prejudicially imply that 
defendant in fact had prior felony convic-
tion; and furthermore, where no objection 
was made by defense counsel and no re-
quest for cautionary instruction was made, 
issue was not preserved for appeal. 
3. Criminal Law e=772(5) 
In prosecution for issuing bad check 
and theft by deception, instruction, "where 
1. Green v. U. S.t 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199. 
